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In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which
are evolving stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between
the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities
in preferences like habit formation.  We show that such nonseparabilities imply that optimal asset
income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature.  We show that under weak conditions, it is possible
to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth
are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement.  The average asset income
tax in this system is zero.
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In this paper, we consider a class of economies in which agents are privately
informed about their skills and those skills might evolve stochastically over
time. As in Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (GKT) (2003), we im-
pose no restriction on the evolution of skills over time. GKT assume that
preferences are additively separable between consumption and labor, and
between consumption at diﬀerent dates. We relax this assumption, and in-
stead require only that preferences over consumption sequences be weakly
separable (not additively separable) from agents’ labor supplies. This as-
sumption means that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
at any two dates is independent of the agent’s sequence of labor supplies.
However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities: the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption at any two dates may depend on other
consumptions. We restrict attention to economies in which agents must
retire at some date S (but may live thereafter).
Our goal is to study the nature of optimal asset income taxes in this
setting with intertemporal nonseparabilities. We ﬁrst use an illustrative
example to show that an optimal tax that is diﬀerentiable with respect to
period t asset income must depend on labor income in future periods. This
result means that an agent must pay his period t asset income taxes at some
future date, after the tax authorities learn his labor income at that future
date. Hence, optimal asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective.
This ﬁnding leads us to consider what we term social security systems.
Agents pay a linear tax on labor income during their working lives. Then,
2during retirement, they receive a constant payment that is conditioned on
their entire labor income history. As well, at the retirement date, they pay
their asset income taxes. These taxes are a linear function of past asset
incomes; the tax rates are a possibly complicated function of the agents’
labor income histories.
There are two important distinctions between what we term a social
security system, and the actual social security system in the United States.
First, in our social security systems, agents are allowed to borrow against
their post-retirement transfers. There is no forced-saving element to the tax
system. Second, agents must pay asset income taxes in period S.
We assume that optimal incentive-feasible allocations are such that two
agents with the same lifetime paths of labor income must have the same
lifetime paths of consumption. Given an optimal allocation with this prop-
erty, we can ﬁnd a social security system that implements that allocation
as an equilibrium. The social security system that implements an optimal
allocation has the property that the average tax rate on period t asset in-
come is zero. As well, in the optimal system, the aggregate amount of taxes
collected on period t asset income is zero.1
We explore the quantitative properties of the optimal social security
system in a simple numerical example. We show that a one-period non-
separability in preferences can have large eﬀects on asset income taxes.
Without nonseparabilities, we know from prior work (see Kocherlakota (2005),
1Social security in the United States is an annuity. This feature is irrelevant in our
model economy, because we assume that all agents die after T periods. We conjecture
that we could implement optimal allocations using social security systems with an annuity
feature, if agents’ time of death were uncertain.
3for example) that agents with low labor incomes in period t face high taxes
on period t asset income. This tax rate serves to deter a so-called double de-
viation in which agents save from period (t−1) into period t a n dt h e ns h i r k
in period t. We show in our example that agents with low labor incomes
in period t may face high taxes (in absolute value) on period (t − 1) asset
income. If preferences exhibit durability, then these tax rates are positive in
sign. If preference exhibit habit formation, then these tax rates are negative
in sign (they are subsidies).
We view our analysis as making two distinct contributions. First, Golosov,
Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (GKT) (2003) initiated a literature on dynamic
optimal taxation from a Mirrleesian approach.2 However, GKT and the suc-
ceeding papers restrict attention to preferences that are additively separa-
ble between consumption and labor, and between consumption at diﬀerent
dates.3 We relax these (severe) restrictions, and show that the resulting op-
timal tax system is necessarily retrospective in how it treats asset income.
Second, we show that it is possible to implement optimal allocations us-
ing a simple tax system that looks like social security. In our optimal system,
agents face a period-by-period labor income tax rate that is independent of
their age or their history of labor incomes. They receive post-retirement
transfers after retirement that depend in complicated ways on their histo-
ries of labor incomes. Thus, in our system, post-retirement transfers, but
not pre-retirement taxes, depend on histories of labor incomes. We believe
2See, among others, Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), and
Kocherlakota (2005).
3Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning (2006) use a two-period parametrized example to
explore numerically the structure of optimal wedges when preferences are nonseparable
between consumption and leisure.
4using social security as a form of implementation may be useful in many
contexts.
Our paper is not the ﬁrst one to point out a role for retrospective taxes on
capital income. Grochulski and Piskorski (2006) demonstrate that retrospec-
tive taxation of capital income is necessary in a Mirrleesian economy with
endogenous skills, in which the technology for skill accumulation requires
input of physical resources and agents can privately divert these resources
to ordinary consumption. In their model, retrospective taxes on capital
income are necessary because the government cannot observe agents’ indi-
vidual consumption, and future observations of realized labor income carry
information about past marginal rates of substitution. If individual con-
sumption were observable, retrospective capital income taxes would not be
needed in their economy. In our model, we show that when preferences are
time nonseparable, an optimal tax system must necessarily be retrospective,
even when the government can observe individual consumption. Also, our
analysis demonstrates how an optimal retrospective tax system can be im-
plemented with a set of taxes and transfers closely resembling the structure
of the U.S. Social Security system.
Huggett and Parra (2006) consider a social security system in the context
of a Mirrleesian model. They, however, are interested in a quantitative
evaluation of the possible ineﬃciency in the current U.S. Social Security
system, and do not consider the question of implementation. In our paper, in
contrast, we demonstrate how a (general) social security system can be used
to implement an optimal social insurance scheme in a Mirrleesian economy.
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) show how an optimal disability insurance
5scheme can be implemented with a tax system that is non-diﬀerentiable in
capital. They consider the case of additively separable preferences, as well as
a stochastic structure tailored to the question of optimal disability insurance.
In our paper, we treat the case of preferences that are time nonseparable
and weakly separable between consumption and leisure. Also, we consider a
more general stochastic structure for skill shocks. Our results can be viewed
as demonstrating a much broader role for a social security system in the
provision of social insurance than just the provision of insurance against
disability.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the environ-
ment we study. Section 3 demonstrates that optimal diﬀerentiable capital
income taxes must be retrospective in our environment. Section 4 provides
an implementation result. Section 5 provides a characterization of an opti-
mal social security system. Section 6 investigates numerically the impact of
time nonseparability on optimal marginal capital income tax rates. Section
7 concludes.
2S e t u p
In this section, we describe our basic model. The model is essentially a
one-good version of GKT (2003), except that we generalize the class of
preferences used by them.
The economy lasts for T periods, and there is a unit measure of agents.
There is a single consumption good at each date that agents produce by
expending labor. Denote period t consumption by ct and period t labor by
6lt. All agents have a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function given by:
V (U(c1,c 2,...,c T),l 1,l 2,...,l S),
where S ≤ T, and U maps into the real line. Agents’ preferences are weakly
separable between consumption goods and labor. We assume that U is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously diﬀerentiable in all its
components. We assume that V is diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave in
its ﬁrst argument U, and decreasing in lt for t =1 ,...,S. Note that agents
c a no n l yw o r ki np e r i o d s1 through S.
Let Θ be a ﬁnite subset of the positive real line. At time 0,N a t u r ed r a w s
a vector θS from the set ΘS for each agent. The draws are independently and
identically distributed across agents, with density function π. At each date
t ≤ S, each agent privately learns his θt; hence, a given agent’s information
at time t consists of the history θt =( θ1,...,θt). An agent in period t with
draw realization θt who works lt units of labor can produce θtlt units of
consumption. We assume that both θt and lt are privately known to the
agent. However, the product yt = θtlt is publicly observable.
An allocation in this setting is a speciﬁcation of (c,y)=( ( ct)T
t=1,(yt)S
t=1),
where ct : ΘS → R+,y t : ΘS → R+, and
(ct,y t) is θt-measurable; ct is θS-measurable if t>S .
Society can borrow and lend at a ﬁxed gross interest rate R ≥ 1. (We can
endogenize R, but it merely serves to complicate the analysis without adding













Because at least some information is private, only incentive-compatible
allocations are achievable. By the Revelation Principle, we can characterize
the set of incentive-compatible allocations as follows. A reporting strategy
σ is a mapping from ΘS into ΘS such that σt is θt-measurable; let Σ be the











We are interested in the set of incentive-feasible allocations (the ones that
are simultaneously incentive-compatible and feasible). The social planner’s





subject to (c,y) being incentive-feasible. Let VSP(W) be the value of the
social planner’s maximized objective, given initial wealth W.
The speciﬁcation of preferences in this setting is more general than in
GKT (2003). In GKT, both V and U are restricted to be additively sep-
arable. In our paper, we allow U and V to be nonseparable. Our key
restriction is that preferences are weakly separable between consumption







then preferences exhibit habit formation with respect to consumption.
3 The Necessity of Retrospective Asset Taxation
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) and Kocherlakota (2005) consider a version of
this model in which the aggregator V and sub-utility function U are both
additively separable. They suppose agents can borrow and lend subject to
diﬀerentiable wealth taxes. They show that, if the resulting equilibrium
allocation is socially optimal, then the tax on wealth accumulated through
period t must depend on individual labor income in period t. Their analysis
demonstrates, however, that an optimal tax on wealth accumulated through
period t can be independent of individual labor income in periods subsequent
to t.
In this section, we re-examine their results while allowing for time non-
separabilities. Using an example, we show that when U is not time separable,
an optimal diﬀerentiable tax on period t wealth necessarily needs to depend
on labor income in some of the future periods t + s, s>0.W ea r g u et h a t
this dependence implies the need for retrospective taxation, in which taxes
on a period t activity are levied in a future period t0.
93.1 A three-period example
Let T = S =3 , Θ = {θL,θH}, with θL < θH =1 ,R=1 , and π(1,1,θH)=
π(1,1,θL)=1 /2. Suppose also that preferences are:
V (U,l1,l 2,l 3)=U − v(l1) − v(l2) − v(l3),
U(c1,c 2,c 3)=u(c1)+u(c2)+u(c3 − λc2), (1)
where u0,−u00 > 0, 0 ≤ λ < 1, and v(0) = 0.L e t (c∗,y∗) be a socially





this section, we use the notation c3i and y3i to represent consumption and
output in period 3 when θ = θi for i = H,L). It is straightforward to show









Now suppose agents can trade bonds with gross interest rate R =1and
are subject to labor income and wealth taxes of the form used in Albanesi
and Sleet (2006) and Kocherlakota (2005). More speciﬁcally, in period 1,
agents pay taxes T1 on labor income y1. In period 2, they pay taxes T2(b2,y2),
if they bring bonds b2 into period 2.T h et a xi np e r i o d3 is T3(b3,y3), where
b3 represents the agent’s bond-holdings at the beginning of period 3.W e
restrict (T2,T3) to be diﬀerentiable in bond-holdings b.
Taking the gross interest rate R and taxes {T1,T2,T3} as given, the
10typical agent seeks to maximize his expected utility
u(c1)+u(c2)+u(c3H − λc2)/2+u(c3L − λc2)/2
−v(y1) − v(y2) − v(y3H)/2 − v(y3L/θL)/2
subject to the following budget constraints
c1 + b2 = y1 − T1(y1),
c2 + b3 = y2 + b2 − T2(b2,y 1,y 2),
c3H = y3H + b3 − T3(b3,y 1,y 2,y 3H)
c3L = y3L + b3 − T3(b3,y 1,y 2,y 3L).
We say that the tax system {T1,T2,T3} implements (c∗,y∗) if (c∗,y∗), com-
bined with some b∗
2 and b∗
3, solves the agent’s problem.
3.2 The non-implementation problem
We know from the work of Albanesi and Sleet (2006) and Kocherlakota
(2005) that if λ =0 , and given a social optimum (c∗,y∗), there exists a tax
system (T1,T2,T3) that implements that optimum. In this sub-section, we
show that there is no tax system of the form {T1,T2,T3} that can implement
a social optimum (c∗,y∗) when λ > 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that the starred allocation (c∗,y∗,b ∗
2,b ∗
3) is a
solution to the agents’ problem under some taxes of the form {T1,T2,T3}.
The agent’s ﬁrst order condition with respect to b2 implies that the marginal











for, otherwise, the agent could do better simply by adjusting c1, b2,a n dc2.
Now consider an allocation (c∗




































Note that because of (2), this welfare, when evaluated at ε =0 , is the same
as the agent’s welfare from the starred allocation. The derivative of W,








































12where the second line follows from (3). The strict inequality is a consequence
of u00 < 0,c ∗
3H >c ∗
3L, and λ > 0. We conclude that, by choosing the
primed allocation with ε small in absolute value and less than zero, the agent
can obtain higher expected utility than the welfare provided by the social
optimum. It follows that no (diﬀerentiable) tax system of the kind proposed
by Albanesi and Sleet (2006) and Kocherlakota (2005) can implement the
social optimum when preferences are not time separable.
What is happening here? In period 1, agents are supposed to hold bonds
b2, and they are supposed to work y∗
3H in period 3 if they are highly skilled.
The tax system is designed to deter agents from holding bonds other than
b2, given that they do work y∗
3i when they have skills θi in period 3. It
also deters agents from shirking when skilled in period 3, given that they
hold bonds b2. However, the tax system fails to deter joint deviations,i n
which agents simultaneously save less in period 1 and work less in period 3.
More speciﬁcally, consider two other trading strategies besides the socially
optimal allocation. Under the ﬁrst alternative strategy, the agent does not
alter b2, but sets y3H = y∗
3L. The social optimality condition (2) implies
that the agent is indiﬀerent between this strategy and the socially optimal
one. Under the second alternative strategy, the agent chooses y3H = y∗
3L
but lowers b2. The agent’s marginal utility of period 2 consumption is lower
when the agent sets y3H = y∗
3L. Hence, the agent likes this second strategy
better than the ﬁrst. The agent is made better oﬀ by a joint deviation of
saving less in period 1 and shirking in period 3.
133.3 Using retrospective taxation
In this subsection, we show how to design a diﬀerentiable tax system that
deters the above joint deviation. We allow the tax on bonds b2 to be post-
p o n e dt op e r i o d3 .W ed e n o t et h i st a xb yT ret
2 (b2,y3) (where ret stands for
retrospective). Note that now the tax on bonds brought into period 2 can
be conditioned on period 3 income. We show how this additional informa-
tion can be used to deter the joint deviation of borrowing in period 1 and
shirking in period 3 without distorting the savings decision of an agent who
c h o o s e st on o ts h i r ki np e r i o d3 .
Under the modiﬁed tax system {T1,T ret
2 ,T3}, agents face the following
budget constraints:
c1 + b2 = y1 − T1(y1),
c2 + b3 = y2 + b2,
c3H = y3H + b3 − T ret
2 (b2,y 1,y 2,y 3H) − T3(b3,y 1,y 2,y 3H),
c3L = y3L + b3 − T ret
2 (b2,y 1,y 2,y 3L) − T3(b3,y 1,y 2,y 3L).
For the optimal allocation (c∗,y∗) (together with some b∗
2,b ∗
3)t ob eas o l u t i o n
to the agents’ utility maximization problem, it is necessary that an analog
of condition (3) be satisﬁed. Under the modiﬁed tax system, this condition
(the Euler equation with respect to b2) takes the form of
u0(c∗
1)=u0(c∗
















14Consider now the following allocation (which agents can obtain by ad-








































The derivative of W, evaluated at ε =0 , is given by
W0(0) = −u0(c∗
1)+u0(c∗








Consider now the Euler equations (4) and W0(0) = 0. Straightforward
algebra shows that if the tax function T ret















for i = H,L, then (4) and W0(0) = 0 are simultaneously satisﬁed. Thus, a
tax system {T1,T ret
2 ,T3},i nw h i c hT ret
2 (b2,y3) nontrivially depends on y3,
is capable of simultaneously deterring the simple deviation in savings b2,a s
well as the joint deviation of adjusting savings b2 a n ds h i r k i n gi np e r i o d3 .
153.4 Retrospective asset income taxation in general
The lesson of the above example readily generalizes. With time separable
preferences, the agent’s desire to save/borrow in period (t−1) is aﬀected by
whether he plans to shirk or not in period t. This connection implies that
taxes on asset income in period t must depend on labor income in period t,
even though the assets were chosen in period (t−1). With time nonseparable
preferences, the agent’s desire to save/borrow in period s may be aﬀected
by whether he shirks in period t>s .Hence, taxes on asset income in period
s must depend on labor income in period t>s .
4 An Optimal Social Security System
In this section, we return to the general model and consider a socially optimal
allocation (c∗,y∗). We suppose that agents trade bonds and work to produce
output, subject to taxes. Our goal is to design a tax system that implements
the given allocation; we refer to this tax system as a social security system
because its retrospective nature means that it closely resembles the current
social security system in the United States.
We make the following assumption about (c∗,y∗).
Condition 1 Let DOM = {yS ∈ RS
+ : yS = y∗(θS) for some θS such that
π(θS) > 0}. Then, there exists b c : DOM → RT




This condition says that two agents with the same optimal sequence
of output y∗, through the retirement period S, have the same optimal con-
16sumption sequences throughout their lifetimes. It is trivially satisﬁed by any
incentive-compatible allocation if θt is i.i.d. over time. We can also prove




so that agents know their entire lifetime sequences of skill shocks in period
1 itself. In an appendix, we provide an explicit example of an environment
in which the optimal allocation (c∗,y∗) does not satisfy Condition 1.4
In each period, agents are able to choose output levels and are able to
trade bonds. In doing so, they must pay taxes that depend on their choices.
We consider a tax system with three components. The ﬁrst component is a
constant tax rate α on output in periods 1 through S. The second component
is a function:
Ψ : RS → R+
that maps agents’ output histories (from periods 1 through S) into a constant
lump-sum transfer in periods t>S . Finally, the third component is a
function τ : RS → RT−1 that maps agents’ output histories (from periods
1 through S) i n t oat a xrate on asset income in periods 2 through period
T. The tax on asset income in periods 2 through S is paid in period S; the
asset income taxes in period t>Sare paid in period t.5
Mathematically, given a tax system (α,Ψ,τ), agents have the following
4Condition 1 looks similar to Assumption 1 in Kocherlakota (2005). However, Condi-
tion 1 is weaker than that assumption; in particular, the counterexample to Assumption
1 in Appendix B of Kocherlakota (2005) is not a counterexample to Condition 1. Unlike
Assumption 1 of Kocherlakota (2005), Condition 1 does not require that consumption in
period t depends only on the history of outputs through period t. We gain this additional
ﬂexibility because we are going to use retrospective taxes.
5With taxes on asset income, instead on assets directly, we assume that R>1. Also,
since transfers Ψ start in period S +1, we assume that S<T. All our results go through,









ct(θS)+bt+1(θS)/R ≤ (1 − α)yt(θS)+bt(θS)





≤ yS(θS)(1 − α)+bS(θS)
for all θS ∈ ΘS;
ct(θS)+bt+1(θS)/R ≤ bt(θS)[1 − (1 − 1/R)τ∗
t(y(θS))] + Ψ(y(θS))
for all t>S ,all θS ∈ ΘS; ct(θS),y t(θS),b T+1(θS) ≥ 0 for all t, all θS ∈
ΘS;ct,y t,b t+1 θt-measurable if t<S ; and b1 =0 .
We refer to a tax system (α,Ψ,τ) as a social security system.W e s a y
that it implements an allocation (c,y) if there exists a bond process b such
that (c,y,b) solves the agent’s problem given (α,Ψ,τ).
Our notion of a social security system has several features in common
with the current social security system in the United States. At every date
before retirement, agents pay a ﬂat tax α on their labor income y.I ne v e r y
period after retirement, agents receive a constant transfer payment that
is conditioned on their history of labor incomes. However, there are two
18major diﬀerences between our social security systems and the current social
security system. First, in our system, agents can credibly commit to repay
debts using their future social security transfers. Second, in our system, at
the time of retirement, agents pay asset income taxes that are conditioned
on their full history of labor incomes. Note that, from the example in the
previous section, we know that optimal asset taxes typically need this kind
of dependence.
We now construct a social security system that implements the given
optimal allocation (c∗,y∗). Let Uct represent the partial derivative of U with
respect to ct, and VU represent the partial derivative of V with respect to








(It is obvious that such an α∗ exists, because we can always set α∗ equal to




















if yS is not in DOM. Here, the role of the upper bound on (1 − α∗) is to
ensure that Ψ∗ is non-negative, so that the social security system delivers
transfers, not taxes, after retirement.
19Finally, deﬁne τ∗ so that for T>t≥ 1:
τ∗
t+1(yS)=
−Uct(b c(yS))/R + Uct+1(b c(yS))
(1 − 1/R)UcS(b c(yS))RS−t−1 if t<S , yS ∈ DOM, (5)
=
−Uct(b c(yS))/R + Uct+1(b c(yS))
(1 − 1/R)Uct+1(b c(yS))
if t ≥ S, yS ∈ DOM,
=0 if yS is not in DOM,
for all t,yS in DOM.
The ﬁrst theorem establishes the optimality of the social security system
(α∗,Ψ∗,τ∗). We use the notation θS ≥ θ
t
to refer to histories θS such that
the ﬁrst t components equal θ
t
.
Theorem 1 The social security system (α∗,Ψ∗,τ∗) implements (c∗,y∗).













≤ yS(θS)(1 − α∗)+bS(θS) for all θS ∈ ΘS,
ct(θS)+bt+1(θS)/R +( 1− 1/R)bt(θS)τ∗
t(y(θS))
≤ bt(θS)+Ψ∗(y(θS)) for all t>S , all θS ∈ ΘS,
ct(θS),y t(θS),b T+1(θS) ≥ 0 for all t,θS,
ct,y t,b t+1 θt-measurable if t<S .
Suppose that yS(θS) is not in DOM for some θS. Then, for that sample
20path, the tax due at S +1equals twice the accumulated value of lifetime
income. Along such sample paths, consumption must be negative, which
violates the non-negativity constraint. Hence, yS(θS) must be in DOM for
all θS.
Now, suppose an agent chooses an output strategy y0 : ΘS → DOM.
Given this choice, our claim is that the agent’s optimal consumption strategy
is b c(y0(θS)). If this claim is true, the agent’s overall choice among (c,y), given
y ∈ DOM, is equivalent to choosing among reporting strategies. Since truth-
telling is optimal given (c∗,y∗), it is optimal for the agent to choose y0 = y∗,
and c0 = c∗.
So, ﬁx an output strategy y0. The agent’s consumption-bond strategy








s.t. ct(θS)+bt+1(θS)/R ≤ (1 − α∗)y0







S(θS)(1 − α∗)+bS(θS) for all θS ∈ ΘS,
ct(θS)+bt+1(θS)/R +( 1− 1/R)bt(θS)τ∗
t(y0(θS))
≤ bt(θS)+Ψ∗(y0(θS)) for all t>S , all θS ∈ ΘS,
ct(θS),b T+1(θS) ≥ 0 for all t,θS,
ct,y t,b t+1 θt-measurable if t<S .
This problem has a strictly concave objective (in c) and a linear constraint
set. Hence, it has a unique optimum characterized by the ﬁrst-order condi-








νt(θS), if t<S ,
VU(U(c(θS)),(y0
t(θS)/θt)S











νt(θS)/R = νt+1(θS) − νt+1(θS)(1 − 1/R)τ∗
t+1(y0(θS)),t≥ S,
where νt represents the multiplier on the agent’s ﬂow constraint. We claim




and b∗∗ satisﬁes the agent’s ﬂow constraints. To validate this claim, we need
to check the agent’s ﬁrst order conditions and to check that b∗∗
T+1(θS) is

















t=1)UcS(b c(y0(θS)))(1 − 1/R)τ∗
t+1(y0(θS))RS−t−1
The deﬁnition of τ∗
t(y0(θS)) ensures that this equality holds for each y0(θS).
Hence, it must hold when summed across θS as well. Similarly, the ﬁrst











Again, the deﬁnition of τ∗ ensures that this ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed
for each y0(θS).
Finally, we need to verify that b∗∗
T+1(θS) is zero. Multiply the period t,
history θS ﬂow constraint by
Uct(θS): =Uct(b c(y0(θS))




−Uct(b c(yS))/R + Uct+1(b c(yS))
(1 − 1/R)UcS(b c(yS))RS−t−1 if t<S , yS ∈ DOM,
=
−Uct(b c(yS))/R + Uct+1(b c(yS))
(1 − 1/R)Uct+1(b c(yS))
if t ≥ S, yS ∈ DOM,
=0 if yS is not in DOM.








As well, from the deﬁnition of Ψ∗:
T X
t=1














It follows that b∗∗
T+1(θS)=0 . We conclude that (c∗∗,b ∗∗) solves the
agent’s consumption-bond problem, given the choice y0. As argued above,
this ﬁnding implies that the agent’s overall problem of choosing (c,b,y),
given y ∈ DOM, is equivalent to the original reporting problem. Hence,
(c∗,y∗) must be optimal.
Thus, given a socially optimal allocation that satisﬁes Condition 1, there
is a social security system that implements it.
245 Characterizing Optimal Asset Income Taxes
In this section, we ﬁrst derive a partial intertemporal characterization of
solutions to the social planner’s problem. We then use that characterization
to prove that the average asset income tax rate is zero in the optimal social
security system. We also demonstrate that, in some circumstances, optimal
asset income taxes may provide an extra incentive to save by introducing a
positive covariance between marginal utility of consumption and the after-
tax rate of return on savings.
5.1 Zero average asset income taxes
GKT (2003) assume that:




Under this restriction on preferences, they show that if (c∗,y∗) is socially
























We can establish a generalized version of this GKT ﬁrst order condition
as follows.
Theorem 2 Suppose VSP(W∗) >V SP(W0) if W∗ >W 0. Suppose too that
(c∗,y∗) is socially optimal given social wealth W∗, and c∗
t(θS) > 0 for all



















for all t ≥ S, all θS.
Proof. Because VSP(W∗) >V SP(W
0
),i tm u s tb et r u et h a ti f(c∗,y∗) is










s.t. U(c(θS)) = U(c∗(θS)) for all θS,
s.t. ct is θt-measurable.







λ(θS)Uct(c∗(θS)) for all t<S , all θ
t
,
π(θS)=Rtλ(θS)Uct(c∗(θS)) for all t ≥ S, all θS,
where λ(θS) is a multiplier on the utility constraint. By substituting the
period S FOC into the period t FOC, we obtain the proposition.
The proposition hypothesizes that having less resources reduces social
welfare; that is, it assumes that VSP(W∗) >V SP(W0) for all W0 <W ∗.
This hypothesis is about an endogenous variable (the planner’s maximized
objective). It can be shown to be true if the utility aggregator V is additively
26separable between the sub-utility U and the sequence of labors (l1,...l T).
(See the proof of Lemma 1 in GKT (2003)).
The proposition is a strict generalization of Theorem 1 of GKT. Suppose
the marginal utility process Uct(c(θS)) is θt-measurable for all t<S .T h i s





























We can use Theorem 2 to derive properties of the optimal social security






It is optimal not to tax asset income after the retirement period S. This result
is intuitive. The only reason that asset income taxes exist in this setting is
to deter agents from saving/borrowing and then working less. Agents don’t
work after period S, and so there is no reason to tax asset income in those
periods.




(1 − 1/R)UcS(c∗(θS))RS−t−1 .
Suppose ﬁrst that the marginal utility processes are such that Uct+1(c∗(θS))




t(y∗(θS)) = 0 for all θS. This measurability restriction is satisﬁed, for
example, if there is no private information problem after period s, s < t.
In general, though, Uct+1 and Uct will not be predictable using time t
information. These marginal utilities will depend on future consumption,
and future consumption will depend on individual-speciﬁc realizations of
θt+s,s>1 because of the informational problem. However, we can calculate












(1 − 1/R)UcS(c∗(θS))RS−t−1 }
=0 ,
where the last equality follows from Theorem 2. If we average asset income
tax rates across all agents with the common history θ
t
, we get zero. More-
over, because bt+1 is θt-measurable, the total asset income tax collections in
28period S are also zero.
5.2 Negative intertemporal wedge and the tax-consumption
covariance structure
In the additively separable case, GKT (2003) demonstrate that optimal
allocations of consumption are characterized by a positive intertemporal
wedge: at every date and state, the marginal return on savings exceeds the
shadow interest rate of every agent in the economy. Albanesi and Sleet
(2006) and Kocherlakota (2005) show how this wedge can be implemented
in a linear capital income tax system in which the average tax rate is zero:
marginal tax rates must be negatively correlated with consumption. This
negative correlation means that capital income tax rates are high when
consumption is desirable, which discourages savings and implements the
positive intertemporal wedge in asset market equilibrium.
In this subsection, we use a robust example to show that the optimal
intertemporal wedge can be negative when preferences are not time separa-
ble. In that example, we also show that the optimal asset income taxes τ∗
implement this negative intertemporal wedge by subsidizing capital income
when consumption is low and taxing it when consumption is high.
Consider again the example of Section 3. In that example, the sub-utility
function U, given in (1), satisﬁes
Uc2(c1,c 2,c 3)=u0(c2) − λUc3(c1,c 2,c 3). (7)






































where the second equality follows from the fact that u0(c∗
2) is a constant.
The strict inequality follows from λ > 0, c∗
3H >c ∗
3L and the fact that the















30where the last line uses (8). The above strict inequality can be written as
Uc1(c∗) >E 1{Uc2(c∗)}. (9)
With R =1 , this inequality shows that the intertemporal wedge between
periods 1 and 2 is strictly negative. In the absence of taxes, agents would
like to deviate from the socially optimal allocation c∗ by borrowing in period
1.
This result is quite intuitive. Since marginal utility of consumption in
period 3 is increasing in the level of consumption habit λc2, providing in-
centives for high eﬀort in period 3 is inexpensive (in terms of the required
spread between c3H and c3L) when the level of habit λc2 is high. Thus, an
increase in consumption c2 relaxes the incentive constraint (2). A similar
increase in consumption c1 has no eﬀect on incentives. Due to this socially
beneﬁcial eﬀect of c2 on incentives, optimal consumption c∗
2 is high, relative
to c∗
1. Private agents, however, do not take this (external) eﬀect into ac-
count. In the absence of taxes, they would like to smooth consumption by
decreasing c∗
2 and increasing c∗
1.
How is this negative wedge implemented? Under optimal retrospective
taxes τ∗
2, the individual Euler equation
Uc1(c∗)=E1{Uc2(c∗)} − E1{τ∗
2Uc3(c∗)}








where the last line follows from the zero average tax result. The optimal tax
rate on b2 co-varies negatively with the marginal utility of consumption in
period 3, and hence co-varies positively with consumption in period 3. This
tax makes bonds held from period 1 into period 2 a better precautionary
hedge: taxes on savings b2, due at t =3 , are low exactly when consumption
c3 is low. This tax promotes savings from period 1 into period 2, and creates
the negative intertemporal wedge.
6 The Impact of Nonseparability: A Numerical
Example
In this section, we demonstrate that the impact of intertemporal nonsepara-
bilities on optimal taxes can be large. We use a numerical example motivated
by the basic disability insurance setup analyzed in Golosov and Tsyvinski
(2006) and earlier in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978).
We set T =6 , and S =4 . We assume Θ = {0,1}, so that agents are
e i t h e ra b l e do rd i s a b l e di nag i v e np e r i o d . 6 Once disabled, an agent remains
disabled. The probability of transiting from being abled to disabled in any
6Our prior analysis assumes that Θ is a subset of the positive real line. Hence, the
example is not literally a special case of our general setup. However, at some notational
cost, we can extend our general analysis to include the possibility that θ equals zero.
















We treat the period length as being about ten years; hence, we set β =2 /3
(which is about 0.9610). We assume that βR =1 .
We are interested in the impact of the nonseparability parameter λ on
optimal asset income taxes. We numerically calculated the optimal alloca-
tion in this setting. We then plugged this optimal allocation into the formula
(5) to derive the optimal asset income taxes. The results are in Table 1. It is
easy to prove that asset income taxes are zero in period t if an agent became
disabled in period s<t .Hence, the table only reports taxes on asset income
in periods 2,3, and 4, as a function of the 4 period histories realized at the
time of retirement. The numbers in the table rate are tax rates in terms of
percentages. Thus, if λ = −0.4, an agent who becomes disabled in period 2
is required to pay 1.07 times his period 2 asset income in taxes at the time
of retirement, plus interest.
33τ\λ −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
τ2(1,0,0,0) 107.13 198.20 135.88 156.95 185.74 226.84
τ2(1,1,0,0) 21.97 10.47 −4.26 −23.62 −50.01 −87.06
τ2(1,1,1,0) −4.95 −5.01 −5.08 −5.16 −5.28 −5.46
τ2(1,1,1,1) −7.20 −7.30 −7.42 −7.57 −7.78 −8.12
τ3(1,1,0,0) 95.61 106.81 121.27 140.33 166.44 203.22
τ3(1,1,1,0) 15.96 6.82 −4.44 −19.26 −39.27 −66.42
τ3(1,1,1,1) −6.13 −6.28 −6.48 −6.76 −7.15 −7.76
τ4(1,1,1,0) 71.30 80.32 91.45 106.25 126.39 153.81
τ4(1,1,1,1) −3.75 −4.23 −4.81 −5.59 −6.65 −8.10
Table 1: Optimal marginal asset income tax rates (percentages).
When λ =0 , so preferences are separable, asset income taxes take the
following simple form. Agents who become disabled in period t pay high
taxes on their asset income in period t. If an agent is abled in a given
period t, he is (slightly) subsidized on his asset income in that period. This
structure of taxes is designed to deter the joint deviation of saving from
period (t − 1) to period t a n dt h e ns h i r k i n gi np e r i o dt.
When λ > 0, so that agents have habit formation with a one-period lag,
the structure of asset income taxes changes as follows. Agents who become
disabled in period t face even higher taxes on their period t asset income.
Agents who become disabled in period t now get much higher subsidies on
their period (t − 1) asset income. This tax structure is designed to deter
the double deviation highlighted in section 2. Intuitively, because of the
one-period habit formation, agents now have an incentive to increase their
period (t − 2) consumption and reduce their period (t − 1) consumption.
Doing so reduces their period t marginal utility of consumption, and hence
increases their incentive to shirk in period t. The social security system
34deters this deviation by subsidizing asset income in period (t − 1).N o t e
that the requisite subsidies on period (t−1) asset income can be enormous.
When λ < 0, consumption is durable (consuming more today reduces the
marginal utility of consumption in the future). Now, agents are tempted to
save from period (t−2) into period (t−1), and then shirk in period t. The
tax system deters this deviation by taxing period (t − 1) asset income at a
high rate if agents become disabled in period t.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Over the past ﬁve years, there has been a great deal of work on optimal as-
set taxation when agents are privately informed about skills. This work has
typically restricted agents’ preferences to be additively separable between
consumption at diﬀerent dates, and between consumption and leisure. Both
restrictions are severe ones. In this paper, we relax these restrictions con-
siderably, and require only that preferences be weakly separable between
consumption paths and labor paths. This class of preferences includes, for
example, the possibility that preferences exhibit habit formation with re-
spect to consumption.
We show that intertemporal nonseparabilities matter. We demonstrate
that if a tax system is diﬀerentiable with respect to asset income, and im-
plements a social optimum, then the taxes on period t asset income must
depend on period t0 labor income, where t0 >t .Given this result, it is nat-
ural to look at tax systems in which period t asset income is taxed only at
the time of retirement. We restrict attention to what we term social secu-
35rity systems. In these systems, labor income before retirement is taxed at a
time-independent rate. At retirement, agents’ asset income is taxed linearly,
but at a rate that depends on their full labor income history. After retire-
ment, agents receive history-dependent constant transfers. We prove that,
because of the weak separability of preferences, the taxes on asset income
average to zero across all agents (as in Kocherlakota (2005)). Asset income
taxes are purely redistributive.
One criticism of the implementations used in Albanesi and Sleet (2006)
and especially Kocherlakota (2005) is that they are unrealistically complex.
In the social security systems that we consider in this paper, all of the
complexity associated with redistributi o ni se m b e d d e di nt h ec a l c u l a t i o no f
taxes and transfers at retirement. We believe that social security systems
can be useful for implementation in many other settings.
36Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide an example of an environment in which our
Condition 1 is violated.
Let W =0 ,T= S =2 . Suppose that preferences are (separable):






Suppose also that R =3 /2 and
Θ = {.5, 1, 1.051425, 1.1392115, 2}.
Let π be such that
π(1.1392115, 2) = 1/4,
π(1.1392115, 1) = 1/4,
π(1, 1.051425) = 1/4,
π(1,. 5) = 1/4.
Under π, therefore, the skill level at t =1 , θ1,i se i t h e r1.1392115 (high)
or 1 (low). The high realization of θ1 also means good prospects for θ2,
the skill level at t =2 . Conditional on θ1 =1 .1392115 the distribution of
θ2 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of θ2 conditional on
θ1 =1 . (It does not however dominate state-by-state.)
Solving numerically for an optimum, we get the following optimal allo-
37cation:
c∗
1(1.1392115) = 1.1622,c ∗
1(1) = 0.9515,
y∗
1(1.1392115) = 1.0358,y ∗
1(1) = 1.0358,
c∗
2(1.1392115,2) = 1.4573,c ∗
2(1.1392115,1) = 0.8231,
y∗
2(1.1392115,2) = 2.2738,y ∗
2(1.1392115,1) = 0.8878,
c∗
2(1,1.051425) = 1.0944,c ∗
2(1,.5) = 0.7970,
y∗
2(1,1.051425) = 0.8878,y ∗
2(1,.5) = 0.2488.
We thus have that the following two histories
(1.1392115, 1),
(1, 1.051425)
are assigned (i) the same output path
y2 =( 1 .0358,0.8878),
and (ii) two very diﬀerent consumption paths:
c∗(1.1392115, 1) = (1.1622,0.8231),
c∗(1, 1.051425) = (0.9515,1.0944).
The function ˆ c postulated in our Condition 1, therefore, does not exist in
this example.
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